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ABSTRACT
Recent decades have seen the rapid development of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)
and methods of prenatal diagnosis. As a result, there are now several ways to predict the genetic
sex of embryos as well as visualizing the sex of fetuses. However, how, when and where these
technologies may be used have become politicized questions, both internationally and in Sweden.
By providing a close reading of the Swedish political debate about technologies for the determi-
nation of the sex of fetuses and embryos from the end of the 1980s onwards, this article shows
how technologies of prenatal diagnosis are articulated as problematic in the context of sex-deter-
mination. By “staying with the trouble” of sex in the political debate about sex-determination, we
discuss how the ability to identify fetal or chromosomic sex through prenatal diagnosis is articu-
lated as an unwanted trouble warranting political and ethical concern. The article also highlights
the “ethico-political” restrictions imposed on information about the unborn’s sex. It shows that,
rather than prenatal diagnosis enabling promissory or hopeful visions of the future, the political
debate is preoccupied with feelings of concern about the potential misuses of these technologies. 
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In 2009
a heated public debate started when the
media reported that a female patient in a
Swedish hospital had requested an abor-
tion, not just once but twice, immediately
after she had found out the sex of the fetus.
The debate centered around the fact that
Swedish law gives women the right to an
abortion until the end of the eighteenth
week of the pregnancy while it is technical-
ly possible to determine the sex of the un-
born2 from the eleventh week (e.g.
Wahlström 2009). A year earlier, in 2008,
the right to an abortion had been extended
to foreign women, after which it began to
be realized that women were travelling
from Denmark and Norway to Sweden to
have abortions. Allegedly these women had
been informed about the sex of their un-
born and then decided to have an abortion
in Sweden, where the laws were less restric-
tive (e.g. Ohlsson and Johannisson 2009).
Concerned voices were raised in an effort
to problematize sex as the sole reason for
the desire to abort. More specifically, the
debate circled around the possibility of re-
stricting either the legitimate grounds for
an abortion or the kinds of information
pregnant women could receive after prena-
tal diagnosis.  
Even though this debate was extensive, it
was far from new. Both before and after the
2009 debate, the question of releasing in-
formation about the unborn’s sex has been
politicized as part of a broader discussion
about the wide range of technologies now
available for prenatal diagnosis. Ultra-
sonography, for example, reveals informa-
tion about the fetus’s visible external geni-
tals, while other technologies provide infor-
mation about its genetic or chromosomal
characteristics, including its sex chromo-
somes. Examples of the latter include
chorionic villus sampling (CVS), preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and
non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT).3 The
use of prenatal diagnosis in Sweden is regu-
lated by a law stating that pregnant women
should be informed about the availability of
prenatal diagnosis and that the decision
over whether or not to use them is theirs to
make (SFS 2006:351).4
As indicated by our account of the 2009
debate, the terrain of prenatal diagnosis
and sex-information is rough and difficult
to navigate, one in which political state-
ments and ethical concerns become entan-
gled with one another. Against this back-
ground, and focusing on the Swedish au-
thorities’ stance on the provision of sex-in-
formation, we aim to put insights from
feminist Science and Technology Studies
(STS) “to work” by analysing the Swedish
political debate from the end of the 1980s
onwards. We attend to how sex-determina-
tion – that is, the prediction of, for exam-
ple, the unborn’s sex through prenatal di-
agnosis – is introduced as an unwanted
“trouble” into the political debate. We ar-
gue for the theoretical productivity of stay-
ing with this trouble as it allows us to at-
tend to the complexities and ambiguities of
this question (cf. Haraway 2016). The
overarching question is: how is sex-deter-
mination (including sex-information) made
into a trouble that needs to be managed
and regulated? 
Our aim is to stay with sex-determina-
tion as a trouble by analyzing how sex is ar-
ticulated as a troubling incidental finding,
how the provision of information to
prospective parents about their unborn’s
sex is considered a problematic area, and
how sex-determining technologies are per-
meated with feelings of anxiety, worry and
concern. In particular, this focus enables us
to discuss how the politics of sex includes
and enacts feelings in contemporary tech-
noscience. In doing so, we will discuss how
sex-determining technologies relate to a vi-
sion of binary sex and how wanted and un-
wanted bodily differences, which often pro-
voke affective arguments, are articulated in
the context of sex-determination.
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The critical study of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (ARTs), including prena-
tal diagnosis, sheds light on the entangle-
ments of politics, ethics and technoscience.
Studies have looked, notably, at ARTs in
scientific and health care practice (Thomp-
son 2005; Franklin and Roberts 2006),
women’s experiences of ARTs (Franklin
1997; Rapp 1999) and the visual culture of
ARTs (Hartouni 1997). Of special rele-
vance for our study are works analyzing
how the body becomes sexed5 through
ARTs (Lie 2002; Thompson 2005). When
it comes to sex-determination, this may
seem a given. However, the point is that,
due to political, social and technological
complexities, how bodies, including fetuses,
become sexed differs (Mitchell and
Georges 1997; Rapp 1999). As we will
show, how fetuses and embryos are articu-
lated as sexed in the political debate over
sex-determination is of interest for under-
standing the politics of technoscience gen-
erally, as well as, more particularly, in rela-
tion to its affective dimensions.
PUTTING FEMINIST STS TO WORK
While sex-determination through prenatal
diagnostics is frequently discussed in the
political debate in Sweden, it is often done
implicitly or marginally. Making the implic-
it explicit, the marginal central, allows us to
take seriously the importance of something
that is rendered marginal in the wider de-
bates our material forms part of.6 This al-
lows us to attend to how, why and for
whom sex-determination is articulated as a
trouble, and to attend closely to its ambi-
guities and complexities. As recent feminist
STS work has shown, by “staying with”
such trouble, it is possible to loosen “some
of the tighter knots” (Roberts 2015, 31)
that hold certain configurations of techno-
science in place (e.g. Martin et al. 2015;
Haraway 2016). To stay with the trouble
thus allows us to examine carefully a mar-
ginal phenomenon that, at first sight, is eas-
ily brushed aside or simplified. Therefore,
for us, the notion of “trouble” serves as
what Donna Haraway (2004, 335) defines
as a “thinking technology”, something to
think with theoretically and methodologi-
cally. By staying with the trouble of sex-de-
termination, we can analyze how, why and
for whom it is presented as problematic.
As indicated by our account of the 2009
debate, sex-determination through prenatal
diagnosis is an area where political naviga-
tions and responses are strongly connected
to ethics. Concerns raised in this context
are therefore simultaneously about both
ethics and politics, entangling the two.
Therefore, it is productive to approach sex-
determination as what Mariá Puig de la
Bellacasa (2017) refers to as an ethico-polit-
ical issue. Doing so, we attend carefully to
how sex-determination is not simply about
ethics, but simultaneously about politics.
Drawing upon feminist STS sensibilities de-
noting politics and ethics as a matter of
making worlds (e.g. Haraway 2004; Puig
de la Bellacasa 2017), we emphasize that
political debates about sex-determination
participate in enacting particular, possible
worlds. Indeed, and as Rayna Rapp (1999,
45) and Nete Schwennesen (2002, 48)
have both noted, ethical reports, like the
government reports we have analyzed, can
be understood as “reproductive technolo-
gies” themselves, as they make specific
worlds possible.
ARTs, such as technologies for prenatal
diagnosis, are affective issues, and not only
ethical and political ones. Others have ana-
lyzed the anxieties, hopes, enjoyment and
pain connected with ARTs (Mitchell and
Georges 1997; Rapp 1999; Adrian 2006).
For example, by defining ARTs as “hope
technologies” (Franklin 1997; Franklin and
Roberts 2006), affective politics are high-
lighted. While acknowledging such in-
sights, we have a partly different focus. In-
stead of concentrating on the affective di-
mensions of lay and health-care practices,
we discuss how and when politicians’ and
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policy-makers’ arguments involve feelings.
This is in line with Ettorre et al.’s call to
feminist researchers on genomes to contin-
ue analyzing “the perceived seductiveness
of particular technologies at particular mo-
ments of time and in particular locations”
(2006, 139).
We acknowledge the increasing interest
in feminist theory more generally (e.g. Ped-
well and Whitehead 2012), and in feminist
STS specifically (e.g. Martin et al. 2015;
Roberts 2015), on the importance of feel-
ings – or what others often call affects – in
understanding ethics and politics. Drawing
upon feminist STS work (Murphy 2015;
Lindén 2016; Singleton and Mee 2017),
we stress that feelings are enacted within
stratified technoscientific worlds and that
they are political and contextual. We ex-
plore how worry, concern and fear are en-
tangled with sex-determination in the poli-
tical debate, paying close attention to the
ways in which feelings are entangled with
ethico-politics, and showing how these is-
sues, taken together, serve to articulate sex-
determination as a troublesome area. 
A focus on feelings shows that, as a per-
sistent trouble, sex-determination in the
political debate seems to invoke what femi-
nist STS scholar Celia Roberts (2015) de-
fines as intense “feelings of concern”.
Roberts (2015) refers to Bruno Latour’s
(2004) notion of “matters of concern” in
developing the notion of feelings of con-
cern. As Puig de la Bellacasa (2017) argues,
the phrase “matters of concern” denotes
worries and thoughtfulness. Drawing upon
Roberts (2015), we argue that the notion
of “feelings of concern” productively
strengthens the importance of feelings,
thus helping us understand how, why and
for whom sex-determination is presented as
troublesome.
THE STUDY AND EMPIRICAL MATERIAL
The analysis presented in this article is
based on a close reading of the discussions
on sex-determination in relation to prenatal
diagnoses in Swedish parliamentary debates
and government documents. We take inspi-
ration from feminist theory approaches to
the practice of close reading that focus on
the nuances and complexities of texts
(Freeman 2010; Espinosa and Lukic 2012).
Close readings are used in a variety of femi-
nist frameworks, including deconstruction
and affective readings. The method can be
used to pay close attention to how texts are
made up of specific, often unstable and am-
biguous configurations, and how such con-
figurations participate in making worlds.
Moreover, close readings are a useful
method for attending not only to the main
articulations in a text, but also to those that
it would be easy to dismiss as unimportant
or marginal (Gallop 2000; Reardon et al.
2015). Since sex-determination often is a
marginal matter in our material, this
method is useful. Put differently, making
use of close reading enables us to “stay
with” the seemingly marginal matters that
enact sex-determination as a trouble.
Selection of the empirical material was
conducted by first mapping out the use of
the concept “sex-determination” in the po-
litical debate. In a second step, we decided
to focus on material from the end of the
1980s onwards because, in the mid-1980s,
politicians from diverse political parties be-
gan to raise the question of the regulation
of the use of prenatal diagnosis concerning,
for example, the provision of sex-informa-
tion (SoU 1984/85:4). The government
initiated an official investigation, which re-
sulted in two official reports: The pregnant
woman and the fetus: two individuals (SOU
1989:51) and Genetics, integrity and ethics
(SOU 2004:20). We analyze these, as well
as the official documents and parliamentary
debates that followed, including govern-
ment bills, motions, committee memorials,
chamber debates and reports from the
Swedish National Council on Medical
Ethics (hereafter referred to as SMER). 
In the last decade, the political debate
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have increasingly focused on the question
of genetic information, such as pre-implan-
tation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and non-in-
vasive prenatal testing (NIPT). No govern-
ment report has been issued discussing
these matters in recent years, but included
in our empirical material are new govern-
mental guidelines for prenatal diagnosis
and PGD (SOSFS 2012:20), as well as a re-
port on prenatal diagnosis that includes a
discussion of NIPT (SMER 2011). All in
all, our material consists of approximately
1,200 pages. 
In the analysis, we have focused on the
parts of the material where sex-determina-
tion is discussed. Due to the overall similar-
ities in these discussions, we present our
analysis thematically and not chronological-
ly, divided into three different sections.
These sections combine the main themes in
our material with our theoretical approach,
involving the ideas of sex as an incidental
finding, technologies as trouble, and feel-
ings of concern.
SEX AS AN INCIDENTAL FINDING
In the political debate, the sex of the fetus
is most often discussed as information that
is not sought after, the real purpose of pre-
natal diagnosis being to gather information
for other medical purposes (SOU 2004:20,
65). For example, the official investigation
from 1989 treats the sex of the fetus as an
“incidental finding” (bifynd). Similarly,
SMER writes:
[A] problem is that, in the case of both meth-
ods [ultrasound and PGD], examinations can
generate “unwanted” incidental findings. The
most common example being discussed is
that ultrasound examinations and chromo-
some analysis can provide information about
the fetus’s sex. (SMER 2006, 8)
When sex-determination is debated in the
political arena, the fetus’s sex is seen as a
concern because it is information not
sought after, but produced only “inciden-
tally” while investigating something else.
The sex of the unborn becomes present as
a persistent trouble that is “unwanted” and
impossible to get rid of. Sex-determination
as an incidental finding, however, is also
contrasted with situations where informa-
tion about the sex of the unborn is, as the
material describes it, “medically justified”
(in the case of “sex-specific” diagnoses such
as haemophilia). Medically justified sex-de-
termination is not only contrasted with sex-
determination for non-medical reasons, it is
problematized considerably less.  
In the material from the late 1980s, the
Committee makes a distinction on ethical
grounds between “general” and “selective”
abortions. General abortion refers to a situ-
ation in which the woman does not want a
child, whereas selective abortion refers to a
situation where an abortion is performed
due to fetal damage (e.g. SOU 1989:51,
12). In the committee’s report, concern
about the ethical implications of selective
abortions is articulated as involving a:
(…) conflict between, on the one hand, hu-
man’s equal worth regardless of health and
ability to function and, on the other hand,
the respect for the woman’s (or the parents’
as a couple) own judgment concerning what
she (they) can cope with and handle. (SOU
1989:51, 12)
However, this distinction between general
and selective abortion is not easily accepted
in the debate that follows the report, as it is
rejected by both SMER and the govern-
ment. The government states that, for the
woman or the family, the question is not
about choosing or not choosing a certain
individual, nor is it about physical function-
ality. For the woman, the government
states, it is rather about not putting oneself
in a situation that one does not feel able to
handle (prop 1994/95:142, 32–34). 
This debate is central to the 1990s de-
bate about prenatal diagnosis. However, it
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also illustrates a difference between the
ways in which sex on the one hand and
medical health status on the other hand are
depicted. While the government clarifies
that, in the case of a “severely damaged or
deformed child” (prop 1994/95:142, 34),
it is important to support the woman’s de-
cision, regardless of her choice and it is
made clear that the sex of the unborn is not
in itself a legitimate ground for an abor-
tion. 
The distinction between decisions that
are medically justified and those that are
not articulates a further distinction between
wanted and unwanted difference. While the
fear of the use of sex-determination creat-
ing a future where sex differences are not
appreciated finds expression, the fear of a
future where differences related to health
and disability are not appreciated is not as
evident. Instead it is stated that an abortion
decision made on the basis of information
gained from prenatal diagnosis cannot be
deemed “a hostile attitude towards disabili-
ties” (prop. 1994/94:142, 33). 
In the debate, fetuses and embryos are
assumed to be sexed based on the observa-
tion of visible genitals (visualized through
ultrasound) or the testing for sex chromo-
somes at different prenatal stages (through,
e.g., PGD and NIPT). For example, one
member of SMER argues that sex-determi-
nation transforms the embryo so that “it is
no longer an ‘it,’ but a she or a he” (minor-
ity report in prop. 1994/95, 80), thus pre-
senting sex as localized to certain parts of
the human body, and as binary.
A fundamental point of departure in the
political debate is that the mother and the
unborn are separate (sexed) individuals
with contrasting interests. For example, in
the report The pregnant woman and the fe-
tus – two individuals, it is written:
One sensitive question concerns how these
incidental findings should be handled. We
have previously stated that, through the de-
velopment of prenatal diagnosis, the unborn
has acquired an increasingly independent sta-
tus in relation to the mother. Thus, the un-
born can no longer be viewed as a part of the
women’s body, and consideration also needs
to be given to the unborn’s interests. (SOU
1989:51, 101)
The focus on the independent statuses of
the woman and the unborn articulates what
others call “fetal subjectivity” (Mitchell and
Georges 1997) or “fetal personhood”
(Franklin 1997). In their analysis of the use
of ultrasound in Canada and Greece,
Mitchell and Georges (1997) make the
point that individuality is created through a
focus on the fetus as a “baby” and not as a
“fetus”. In the case of sex-determination,
this instead becomes a question of how
prenatal diagnosis is assumed, incidentally,
to make the fetus visible as a sexed subject
(“he” or “she”), and not as an object with-
out a sex (“it”). That is, the focus on the
fetus as not an “it” but a “she” or a “he” is
tied to a vision of binary sex as closely con-
nected with individuality.
One government report, however, ac-
knowledges some of the complexities in-
volved in the determination of someone’s
sex. The report refers to eight different cri-
teria for sex-determination: 
[…] (i) sex chromosomes, (ii) patterns of sex-
hormones, (iii) gonads, i.e., testes or ovaries,
(iv) internal sexual organs, (v) external geni-
tals, (vi) secondary sexual characteristics, like
hair growth, vocal pitch and distribution of
body fat, (vii) the visual sex, such as it is as-
sumed by others, and accordingly the role in
which the person has been raised, (viii) the
psychological gender identity, i.e., the per-
son’s own gender perception. (SOU
2004:20, 135)
This section is followed by the statement
that in most cases these different criteria
“do not cause any trouble” but that there
exist “some for which the picture is not as
clear” (SOU 2004, 135). In contrast to the
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overall political discussion, these eight cri-
teria enable a more complex view of sex-de-
termination. While these eight criteria are
not a final solution for how to define some-
one’s sex – it is certainly more complex
than that – they point towards a less binary
vision of sex difference.
As we have shown, in the political de-
bate, sex-determination is articulated as a
troubling incidental finding that comes
about through a range of different ethico-
political distinctions: between medical and
non-medical justified sex-selection, be-
tween general and selective abortion, be-
tween the unborn and the mother as sepa-
rate individuals, and between the unborn as
an “it” and as a “she” or a “he”. All of
these separations identify sex-determination
as a troublesome area. 
TECHNOLOGIES OF TROUBLE
In the political discussions surrounding
prenatal diagnosis, an overarching concern
is the risk of the wrongful use of informa-
tion about the sex of the unborn. Wrongful
use refers to a situation where information
about the fetus’s sex would result in an
abortion (e.g. through ultrasound) or in
the deliberate preselection of embryos (e.g.
through PGD). The Committee of the Un-
born Child considers the general use of fe-
tal diagnosis for gathering medical informa-
tion about the fetus and its health status to
be ethically acceptable. However, in rela-
tion to sex-determination, the distinction
already discussed between uses that are
medically justified and those that are not is
present. The report states that:
Foetal diagnosis should not, however, be per-
mitted to be used for the purpose of deter-
mining the sex of the child if this is not – as
in the case of haemophilia – medically moti-
vated. (SOU 1989:51, 129, English in origi-
nal)
Sex becomes most troublesome in instances
where it is not medically relevant. When
sex-determination is medically justified, it is
viewed as ethically acceptable; when it is
not, it becomes a troublesome area. For ex-
ample, while SMER states that it is ethically
acceptable to use genetic information to di-
agnose diseases that are inherited with the
X-chromosome, the same information is
viewed as problematic in relation to fetal-
DNA (NIPT) analysis due to the potential
non-medical uses of sex information. They
write:
If sex-determination should be part of a fami-
ly planning strategy, the question becomes
ethically controversial. If an abortion is justi-
fied with the argument that the fetus has the
“wrong sex”, this could be questioned from
an ethical perspective, since sex is not a dis-
ease and should hardly be a reason for abor-
tion. (SMER 2011, 20)
Throughout, sex-determination seems to
be considered the most problematic when
it is connected to the possibility of sex-se-
lection, either through abortion (on the
basis of sex) or preselecting embryos based
on information about sex rather than on
medical grounds. Thus, sex-information as
such is not articulated as a trouble. Instead,
the potential practices that might follow
from this knowledge are what are trouble-
some and need managing. 
It is frequently emphasized that non-
medically justified information about the
sex of a fetus or embryo should only be
given to the woman being examined if she
requests it (e.g. prop. 1994/95:142, 26–
27). If she does not want the information,
the treating physician should actively in-
form the woman about matters that could
be relevant to the unborn’s health, but not
about its sex. This proposed solution to re-
strict but not ban sex-information has be-
come the dominant solution and has been
repeated in subsequent political debates
since.  
Throughout, values of self-determina-
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tion and human integrity are referred to as
reasons for the women’s (or prospective
parents’) right to obtain information about
the unborn’s sex if it is requested. SMER
(2004, 25) refers to “the right to self-de-
termination” in arguing that “[i]nforma-
tion about the fetus’s sex should […] not
be automatically provided, but if it is re-
quested it must be issued”. By invoking the
idea of self-determination it is assumed that
it is not possible to prohibit women from
receiving information about the sex of the
fetus.
The focus on self-determination is re-
peatedly combined with the idea that a
woman is competent to make a good
choice based on the information she is giv-
en. For instance, a government bill from
1994 states that “[w]e consider the preg-
nant woman to be fully competent to han-
dle all information, and this includes infor-
mation about the fetus’s sex” (prop,
1994/95:142). Here, the woman is con-
sidered capable of making the “right”
choice, yet the idea that she should only be
given information about the sex of the un-
born’s sex if she requests it assumes that
she knows that she can receive this infor-
mation. 
The choice to decide to have an abortion
based only on information about the un-
born’s sex is mentioned several times as
ethically unacceptable or as incompatible
with prevailing western understandings of
human dignity. For example, SMER con-
fronts sex-information with a western
equality discourse, stating that it is “diffi-
cult to combine the use of prenatal diagno-
sis for the mere purposes of deciding the
fetus’s sex with the equal values ascribed to
men and women in our western tradition”
(prop. 1994/95:142, appendix 2, 68). The
Swedish Medical Research Council argues
along the same lines: sex-determination, if
not medically justified, “constitutes a factu-
al impingement on human dignity and it is
therefore ethically objectionable” (prop.
1994/95:142, appendix 4, 81). 
Read in light of the focus on non-med-
ically justified sex-determination as ethically
unacceptable, the idea that the woman is
capable of making the “right” choice can
be understood as her being capable of mak-
ing the decision not to have an abortion
based on information about the sex of the
unborn. Nonetheless, the decision to with-
hold sex-information if the woman does
not request it reveals a lingering concern
that some women or prospective parents
might choose wrongly. Thus, a tension is
present between what is perceived to be the
right choice and the possible troubling mis-
use of the technology that arises from the
idea that self-determination and human in-
tegrity are essential values in Swedish soci-
ety.
FEELINGS OF CONCERN
In the debate, technologies of prenatal di-
agnosis are discussed in terms of both tech-
nological and social development and of
the possibilities that are enabled by their
“fast” and “explosive” development. In the
government report from 1989, for in-
stance, it is stressed that “the rapid devel-
opment” (SOU 1989:51, 24) of ARTs cre-
ates new possibilities for sex-determination.
Technological development is most often
articulated as a problem. For example, con-
cerning PGD, the government report from
1989 expresses a concern that the “devel-
opment has gone too far before society has
gained information about these matters and
is able to regulate these activities” (SOU
1989:51, 111). There is thus a worry that
PGD is too efficient and that it may be dri-
ven too far. The fear is that this may be one
step towards an undesirable future in which
all possible unwanted qualities have already
been deselected at the pre-embryo stage.
SMER writes: “The selective characteristics
of the PGD method, in combination with
the commercialization of reproduction,
raises concerns”. They mention sex prese-
lection as one existing option, and write
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that “soon other characteristics may also be
possible to predict” (2004, 19). 
The unpredictability of the future uses of
prenatal diagnosis is articulated as worry-
ing. There is a fear that the development is
happening too quickly and that it will not
be possible to control it. Thus, a dystopic
vision of a future that does not accept and
appreciate difference is envisioned. Such
fears are explicit in the official report Ge-
netics, Integrity and Ethics, where they dis-
cuss the report The pregnant woman and
the fetus – two individuals:
There is simply a fear that women/parents
will deselect some fetuses in preference to
others and about where a development of this
kind might lead. The inquiry’s view of prena-
tal diagnosis may be said to have been charac-
terized by such a fear (…). (SOU 2004:20,
267)
Stating that the investigation and the offi-
cial report were both characterized by a
fear that women or prospective parents
would decide to “choose some fetuses in
preference to others”, the committee im-
plicitly refers to sex preselection. 
In both official reports, words such as
“hesitation”, “carefulness” and “ethical
watchfulness” are used, something which,
together with articulations of fear and wor-
ry, serve to present prenatal diagnosis and
sex as an ethico-political issue permeated
with what Roberts (2015) regards as in-
tense feelings of concern.
Feelings of concern are also present when
members of the Christian Democrats and
the Social Democrats discuss the possibili-
ties for sex-determination through prenatal
diagnosis (mot. 1994/95:So28; protocol
2005/06:111; mot. 2005/06:So530;
mot.1994/95:So497). In a minority report
to the government report (2004:20, 384),
one Christian Democrat member writes that
“the micro eugenic aspects of PGD worries
me”, since “today, for example, it is possible
to choose [a fetus or embryo] based on
sex”. Other members write that technolo-
gies of prenatal diagnosis are “worrying,”
even “alarming,” since they are used in a
“completely instrumental” manner. This is
discussed as an example of how “the phe-
nomenon of reproduction is becoming
more and more technologized” and how
“the integrity of early human life risks being
completely abolished” (minority report in
SOU 2004:20, 385). Moreover, one mem-
ber calls this a “slippery slope”, since the
development of ARTs has happened too
quickly to be controllable. Here, prenatal
diagnosis is articulated as dangerous since it
may bring about a highly unwanted future.
The feelings of concern articulated by
the Christian Democrats (and in the mo-
tion by members of the Social Democrats
mentioned above) are similar to the domi-
nant stand one finds in the political debate.
However, unlike the others, they argue that
a prohibition is needed on providing infor-
mation about the sex of the unborn to the
pregnant woman. This is necessary, it is
stated, since some might misuse prenatal
diagnosis for their own benefit, and not for
the good of the unborn. 
Since it is emphasized that such misuse is
extremely rare, the majority of women who
do not misuse sex-information are implicit-
ly contrasted with the minority who may
use the information wrongly. As discussed
in the last section, this distinction between
a woman’s right to choose and possibly
problematic decisions is a general thread in
the debate. However, this distinction be-
comes particularly evident in relation to
some of the politician’s focus on ARTs as
so worrying that a ban on providing infor-
mation about the sex of the unborn is nec-
essary.
We have shown that prenatal diagnosis
is presented as worrying and that tech-
nological developments are articulated
through feelings of concern about the pos-
sible future uses of these technologies.
Thus, the political debate does not involve
a story about scientific progress and suc-
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cess, but rather it is dominated by voices ar-
guing for the need to be cautious and hesi-
tant regarding the use of these technolo-
gies.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this article, we have analyzed how sex-
determination is made into a trouble that
needs managing. We have examined how
the sex of the unborn is articulated as, most
often, an unwanted, incidental finding,
how technologies for sex-determination are
articulated as a problem, since some people
may misuse them, and how the politics of
sex-determination are permeated with feel-
ings of concern.
As we have discussed, the trouble of sex
is presented as a question of whether infor-
mation about the unborn’s sex should be
provided to the pregnant woman or
prospective parents. The predominant solu-
tion is articulated through a formulation
stating that, if the woman or prospective
parents request it, information about the
unborn’s sex should be provided. This for-
mulation contains an implicit idea that the
woman or prospective parents have the
right to decide on the basis of the values of
self-determination and human integrity.
However, this puts these values in tension
with the recurring statement that it is un-
ethical to abort a fetus or deselect an em-
bryo based on sex-information alone. This
serves to draw a boundary between those
decisions that are deemed to be good and
others that are problematic. This in its turn
is related to the present fear of a develop-
ment towards a society that does not appre-
ciate (binary) sex differences. Yet, the selec-
tion of embryos or fetuses based on
whether or not they show a disability is as-
sumed to be less problematic. In this sense,
yet another trouble emerges: when bound-
aries are drawn between what is ethically
justifiable and what is not, an ethico-politi-
cal boundary is also drawn between wanted
and unwanted difference.
We have shown how prenatal diagnosis
in a context of sex-determination is articu-
lated as a troublesome area. While one
could expect at least part of the debate on
sex-determination to be formed by enthusi-
asm and optimism over the possibilities en-
abled by prenatal diagnosis, this focus is to
a large extent absent. Our study highlights
ARTs as technologies of trouble and con-
cern rather than, as most feminist STS
studies have emphasized, technologies of
promise, hope and/or enjoyment (see e.g.
Franklin 1997; Thompson 2005). 
The focus on technologies of concern
and trouble sheds empirical light on the re-
cent feminist STS critique of the tendency
in feminist theory to imagine positive or
happy feelings as opening up for, or affirm-
ing, a more promising world (Murphy
2015; Lindén 2016; Singleton and Mee
2017). As these scholars argue, the politics
of diverse feelings need to be taken serious-
ly. This is especially the case in our study, as
the political debate about sex-determina-
tion is dominated by voices arguing that we
should be hesitant and cautious in respect
to ARTs. This suggests that the political
implications of such feelings (e.g. concern,
worry and fear) need to be attended to.
Our study demonstrates how closely
feelings are related to ethico-political con-
cerns. Politics and ethics are entangled in
the debate we have analyzed: the political
decision to restrict sex-information to situa-
tions where the woman or the prospective
parents request it is closely linked to what is
perceived as ethically justifiable, and that,
in its turn, is presented as preserving the
values of self-determination, gender equali-
ty and human integrity. Moreover, the so-
lution to restrict sex-information is to a
high degree connected to concerns, fears
and worries about the potential misuse of
the technologies. Taken together, this
clearly illustrates the ethico-politics of feel-
ings in technoscience. 
Diverse feelings can be understood as in-
volving ethico-politics in a range of empiri-
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cal areas (e.g. Puig de la Bellacasa 2017).
Thus, we would not argue that feelings as
an ethico-political issue are limited to con-
cern, worry or fear, nor to the context of
sex-determination. Rather, based on our
study, we argue that an important aspect of
the ethico-politics of feelings in techno-
science is to stay with the trouble of how
diverse feelings are evoked, managed and
mobilized to pursue political arguments.  
While some instances in the analyzed po-
litical debate show how feelings of fear and
concern can be used to pursue problematic
or conservative political standpoints (such
as visions of binary sex, technological de-
velopments as inherently worrying or the
integrity of early human life as essential),
other instances are less straightforward.
Based on our results, we emphasize the
need to take seriously the complexity of all
feelings, not least given the potential social
implications of technoscientific politics. Im-
portantly, how ARTs, whether technologies
of enjoyment and hope, or technologies of
trouble and concern, are managed, regulat-
ed and debated, matters for the worlds we
are yet to live in.
NOTES
1. The research conducted for this article was sup-
ported by the Swedish Research Council [Dnr
446– 2014–1749].
2. Following Lupton (2013), we use the wording
“the unborn” instead of, for example, “the unborn
child”. As Lupton (2013, 6) argues, “the termi-
nology that is adopted to refer to the products of
human conception is inevitable politically, cultural-
ly and emotionally charged”. As Lupton shows, if
we would refer to fetuses or embryos as unborn
babies or children, we would assume that such en-
tities are already infants and persons. Similarly, we
use the wording “prospective parents” instead of
parents or parents-to-be, this to not presume that
the existence of a fetus or embryo positions people
as parents of those entities, or that they automati-
cally will become parents in the future.
3. Ultrasonography is a common prenatal techno-
logy that uses sound waves to make the fetus visi-
ble on a monitor. It gives information about how
the pregnancy is proceeding. Amniocentesis is a
test of the amniotic fluid, where cells from the fe-
tus can be detected and tested. Chorionic villus
sampling (CVS) involves collecting a piece of the
placenta that is then tested. NIPT is a relatively
new procedure that collects and tests fetal cells in a
blood sample from the pregnant woman. PGD en-
tails screening fertilized eggs during IVF treatment
and before they are implanted. The social outlook
on gender selection in, for example, the USA
seems to be under transformation, from a practice
that virtually everyone distances themselves from
to one that has gained at least some acceptance
(Ettorre et al. 2006; Bhatia 2010). This change
could partly be explained with reference to a dif-
ferentiation between the first and second genera-
tion of sex-preselection methods (Bahtia 2010).
Whereas the first generation allowed abortions of
fetuses on the basis that they were perceived to be
the “wrong” sex, the second generation involved
selecting embryos or sperm with the “right” sex
(ibid.). For an overview of feminist perspectives on
sex selection, see Burrell 2005.
4. PGD is regulated by Swedish law and may not
be used to select embryos based on any specific
predicted attributes. It may only be used to make
sure that the embryo does not carry any serious
genetic disease inherited from the prospective par-
ents. Only in rare cases (and if permitted by the
National Board of Health and Welfare) can PGD
be used to select embryos that are potential
donors of stem cells to a severely ill sibling (SFS
2006:351).
5. We follow other feminist scholars in using the
word “sex” instead of “gender” in this article (e.g.
Roberts 2014). Highlighting the impossibility of
separating a social gender from physical sex, these
scholars show that an “additional” term connoting
the social dimension easily reproduces a problem-
atic separation between gender and sex. 
6. Previous research on sex-determination in polit-
ical debates in Sweden is scarce. One exception is
the political scientist Lenita Freidenvall’s analysis
of the history of abortion in Sweden showing how,
in the beginning of the 1990s, politicians linked
arguments against sex selection to “a Christian and
human rights perspective” (2005:133). In the in-
ternational context, however, scholars have studied
policies and debates surrounding the issues of se-
lective abortions, prenatal diagnosis and PGD in
relation to sex-determination (Scott 2007; Bhatia
2010; Karpin and Savell 2012). 
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